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Decentralization and Education Performance: A First View to the Brazilian Process 
 
Abstract 
This paper analyses the impact of the decentralization in educational system that is taking place in Brazil in 
the last decade, as a result of several laws that encourage municipalities to invest in fundamental education. 
The proficiency tests undertaken by the government allows to follow some public schools in two points in 
time. Therefore we were able to create an experimental group with the schools that were under state system in 
the SAEB exam and have migrated to the municipality system by the time of Prova Brasil and a control group 
with the schools that were under the state system between the two exams and compare the difference in their 
results using a fixed effect panel data analysis. The difference in difference estimator indicates that there is no 
significant change in the performance of the students.   
 
JEL Classification: I21, I28. 




As it is well known, by any international or national standards the quality of public 
education in Brazil is very poor. This is probably a consequence of the fast and 
disorganized increase in educational coverage that took place along the last decades. 
Decentralization of the educational system is viewed as one of the several possible policies 
to handle this problem, since it can turn the system more flexible and transparent, improve 
its accountability and governance and promote family and community participation. In 
Brazil decentralization is associated with the transfer of control to the municipalities of the 
fundamental education, 1
st to 8
th grades, which used to be, at least partially, under the 
control of the states administration. During the 1990s several laws
1 consolidated this 
process, among them FUNDEF plays a fundamental role as it induces the municipalities to 
invest in fundamental education.  A large amount of resources have been spent in this 
process in the last ten years but very few studies have been made to assess its effectiveness. 
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the impact of this decentralization on student’s 
performance. We do this comparing the difference in the students performance at school 
level between two periods of time comparing three groups of schools: those that were 
already under the municipality control at the time of the SAEB exam; those that were under 
the states control in the SAEB exam and remained in it by the time of  Prova Brasil and; 
those that migrated from the state to the municipality control between the two periods 
exams. The analysis is restricted to students in the 4
th grade since it is the first cycle of the 
fundamental school the main goal of the decentralization.      
 
2. School Performance in Brazil  
Like in the most part of the world, students performance in Brazil is determined by 
family characteristics, institutional factors and school resources: classroom hours, access to 
books, teacher experience and teaching methods (e.g., Fuller, 1990; Fuller and Clarke, 1994 
and Hanushek, 1995). Those resources are intimately related to the school management 
and, consequently, to the educational system to which the school belongs. In Brazil public 
schools can be under federal, state or municipal control, that correspond roughly to the 
                                                 
1 Lei de Diretrizes e Bases da Educação Nacional 9394/96, Emenda Constitucional 14/96 (FUNDEF), Lei 
9424/96 and Decreto Federal 2264/97 are the most importants. 
  1degree of decentralization and autonomy of decisions at school level  The research on the 
impact of decentralization on education in Brazil has two approaches: the first one are case 
studies (Gil and Arelano, 2004, Araújo, 2005, Oliveira 1999, Oliveira , 1997, Pinto 2000) 
that highlight the absence of coordination between the state and municipal educational 
systems that resulted in a miscellaneous of pedagogical policies; the absence of scale 
economies that turned the system unnecessarily expensive and the administrative 
inexperience of the municipalities in this subject.  
The other approach are quantitative studies that, using econometrics methods, try to 
understand the impact on the student’s perform of several factors such as family 
background, school facilities, community resources, opportunity cost of education, and the 
educational system to which the school belongs to: private or public and among the public: 
municipal or state. School performance is usually measured by years of schooling, 
enrolment and abandon rates, age-grade distortion and, more recently, by the proficiency 
scores in the national exams promoted by the federal government.  
One of the first studies to take into account those factors is Barros, Mendonça, 
Santos and Quintaes (2001).Using the Brazilian Household Surveys, PNAD and PPV it 
founds that even taking into account all above mentioned variables, still the most important 
determination of years of schooling is the family background, mainly parents schooling and 
family per capita income. Community resources, measured by average schooling and 
income of the population, school resources, measured by number of schools and 
commuting time have a positive but inexpressive impact while schooling of the teachers 
had an ambiguous effect: positive for fundamental school and negative for high school. 
Albernaz, Ferreira and Franco (2002), also include school’s information in the analysis of 
the determinants of students performance as measured by the proficiency scores of the 
SAEB tests in a HLM model. Apart from the usual results they found that the 
socioeconomic level of the student’s peers are also important determinants of educational 
performance and that  students in private schools perform better than those in public 
schools. Riani (2004) studying age-grade distortions found that family background and 
school resources are also the most important factors but among the community resources 
the percentage of public schools, and particularly of municipal schools, plays a positive role 
in reducing distortion in the fundamental cycle.  
Those studies take into account the school, community resources and other 
administrative issues on the students´ performance but only as control variables and not as 
the central issues of the analysis. The studies of D’Atri (2007) and Madeira (2007), on the 
other hand focus on the impact of decentralization on students performance.   The first one, 
using data from the School Census, analyzes the impact of FUNDEF on students´ 
enrolment, abandon and age-grade distortion rates comparing two periods: 1998 and 2004. 
Controlling for students and schools characteristics, the main result is that  students in 
municipal schools still presented a lower perform than those in state schools. The paper 
also finds that this lower performance is more related to the expansion of the municipal 
system than to the migration of schools from state to municipal system. The study by 
Madeira (2007) is restricted to the state of São Paulo where, previously, fundamental 
education was mostly state responsibility and a huge effort is being made to municipalize 
the system. Using data from the School Census from 1996 to 2003 he analyzes the impact 
of the control transfer to municipalities on abandon, enrolment and age-grade distortion as 
well as in the use of schools inputs such as number of hours in the classroom, size of the 
classroom, and equipment utilization. The results are ambiguous: they show a significant 
  2positive impact on the use of school inputs but a negative impact on students` performance 
indicators, confirming D’Atri results. The results of both studies are very interesting but 
present some limitations mainly the use of performance indicators such as enrolment, 
abandon and age-grade distortions that may be tainted by issues not directly related to it. 
Another drawback, specifically to D’Atri study, is the use of data at the municipal level that 
apart from the limitations of this level of aggregation, it doesn’t control for the fixed effects 
of the schools that is a possible source of bias in the analysis. In our study we try to 
overcome those limitations using a panel data study that allows us to compare the results of 
the students in schools before and after the change in control to the municipalities takes 
place with the results of students in schools that remained under the states control in both 
periods.  
 
3. Descriptive Analysis 
 
The proficiency results of the 4th grade students along the years show that students 
in private schools perform better than those in the public system, either municipal or state 
managed. Their score was 30% higher on average but, on the other hand they also 




Proficiency Scores: SAEB e Prova Brasil 
4ª grade   Math  Reading 
Math  1997  1999  2001  2003  2005  1997  1999  2001  2003  2005 
State  178,8  173,0  172,8  176,9  177,7  174,4  159,8  162,0  168,1  168,5 
   (37,2)  (36,3)  (39,9)  (40,2)  (42,2)  (39,8)  (38,8)  (43,3)  (42,8)  (41,0) 
Municipal  174,9  169,4  165,9  171,3  172,5  170,5  156,2  155,2  164,5  163,8 
   (36,4)  (35,2)  (38,8)  (39,1)  (41,7)  (37,7)  (37,6)  (42,7)  (42,1)  (40,7) 
Private  225,1  217,6  223,8  225,1  227,8  219,2  208,9  209,7  215,2  213,9 
   (49,3)  (44,0)  (48,1)  (45,9)  (47,6)  (50,5)  (48,5)  (48,0)  (45,4)  (43,6) 
Total  189,0  183,7  185,8  190,7  193,6  184,4  171,9  174,0  182,2  182,9 
   (45,4)  (43,5)  (49,3)  (48,2)  (50,9)  (46,7)  (47,2)  (50,6)  (49,1)  (47,7) 
SD in parenthesis 
 
Within the public system, the students in the state schools presented a better 
performance than those at the municipal schools, but the difference is very small although 
significant: 2% on average in both, math and reading. 
 
Table 2  
  Score Difference between State and Municipal Schools  Δ(S-M) 
  1997 1999 2001 2003 2005
Math  3,91 3,64 6,86 5,66 5,19
  (0,734**) (0,779**) (0,754**) (0,621**) (0,739**)
Reading  3,87 3,61 6,75 3,63 4,66
  (0,789**) (0,835**) (0,825**) (0,666**) (0,723**)








  3  The data bases from SAEB and Prova Brasil, on the other hand, allow us to make a 
more detailed comparative analysis since we can follow some of the schools at least in two 
periods of time: the year the school participated in the SAEB test and the year of Prova 
Brasil, which is mandatory for almost all schools in the public system.  We can also track 
schools that belonged to the state system in the SAEB test but at the time of Prova Brasil 
had already moved to the municipal system. Therefore we can have the results of the same 
schools in at least two points in time under the same system, either state, which we will call 
the S-S schools or municipal, the M-M schools, or under the two different systems the S-M 
schools.
2 As a consequence we have 4 panels for each school cohort: 1997-2005; 1999-
2005, 2001-2005 and 2003-2005, taking into account each group of schools. Unfortunately 
we don’t know exactly when the change of control to the municipalities occurred. For 
instance for a school that was under the state control when it participated in the SAEB 
exam in 1997 and was under the municipality in 2005 in Prova Brasil, the transfer may 
have occurred in any of those eight years.     
  The school panel, i.e. the number of schools that matched SAEB and Prova Brasil, 
represent 23% of the total schools of the SAEB data base as can be seen in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 
Public School Panel  
   S-S  M-M  S-M  % TOTAL ANO 
1997 205 227  6 26,0%
1999 499 674  27 22,3%
2001 297 413  17 14,3%
2003 649 687  22 33,2%




On the other hand the number of students of those schools represent between 23% to 52% 
of the students of the public system in the SAEBs data base, as can be seen in Table 4.. 
 
Table 4 
School Panel: Number of Students (math+reading) 
   S-S  M-M  S-M  % TOTAL 
1997 3320 3135 99 37,4%
1999 1989 2759  142 22,6%
2001 3167 4387  174 27,8%
2003 6112 6567  185 52,2%
Source: INEP 
 
The performance of the three groups of schools in the proficiency tests can be seen 
in Table 5.  
Table 5    
School Panels Proficiency Scores -  SAEB e Prova Brasil  4a grade 
Math  1997 2005 1999 2005 2001 2005 2003 2005
                                                 
2 There is also the possibility of the school moving form the municipal to the state system, but in practice we 
don’t observe this kind of movement.  
  4Total  178,79 179,21 173,48 177,73 171,24 178,12 175,14 180,13
S-M  178,53 187,86 174,43 179,65 174,16 181,06 170,96 179,92
M-M  177,65 175,52 173,14 176,36 169,11 177,26 172,52 178,73
S-S  179,83 183,23 173,93 179,98 174,04 179,60 177,87 181,97
reading  1997 2005 1999 2005 2001 2005 2003 2005
Total  174,87 172,64 161,39 170,71 160,86 171,21 167,82 172,79
S-M  176,27 177,19 161,50 173,45 163,22 173,01 169,91 175,01
M-M  173,33 168,48 161,31 169,04 159,09 170,17 165,80 171,09
S-S  183,98 177,30 159,25 173,41 162,58 171,89 159,95 172,15
 
As we observed before, for the whole sample, state schools, either those that 
remained as such or those that migrated to the municipal system later on, performed a little 
better than the municipals ones in math and presented an oscillatory behavior with respect 
to reading in both exams, SAEB and Prova Brasil.  
 
Our main interest is to compare the results of the group of state schools that 
remained in the system, the S-S schools, (our control group) with the group of schools that 
eventually moved to municipal control, the S-M schools (our treatment group). We observe 
in Table 6 that the difference in scores between the two groups in the SAEB test, i.e. before 
the change of control took place, is not significantly different:  
 
Table 6 
School Panels: Difference Proficiency 
Results in the SAEBs Tests  
 Math  Reading 
   ΔS-S S-M  ΔSS-S M 
1997 1,3  -7,7
 (0,33)  (-1,2)
1999 -0,5  2,2
 (-0,15)  (0,6)
2001 -0,1  0,6
 (-0,03)  (0,2)
2003 6,9  10,0
   (2,67)  (3,3)
t- statistics in parenthesis 
 
The differences in performance oscillate in favor of one or the other system but they 
are significant only in 2003 cohort when the schools that latter moved to the municipality 
control presented a clear and significant inferior result in both math and reading.. For the 
other cohorts, although we observe some higher differences like in the 1997, they were not 
significant at 5% level.   
 
The average profile of the students in both groups of schools when they were still 
under the state system is also not very different, as can be seen in Table 7.  
 
Table 7 
School Panels: Students Profile in Schools under 
State Control by Group of Schools 
Cohort  1997 1999 2001 2003
  5Skin Color (% whites and yellows) 
S-S  45,1% 43,9% 44,3% 40,1%
S-M    42,6%  38,5%  39,1% 30,9%
Age 
S-S  11,4 11,3 10,7 10,8
S-M  11,8 10,9 10,9 10,8
Father’s Schooling 
S-S  7,1 7,0 7,1 8,0
S-M  7,0 6,8 7,5 7,8
Mother’s Schooling 
S-S  7,1 7,0 6,9 7,9
S-M  6,8 7,0 7,2 8,0
 
The largest difference, between the students in the two groups of schools, is with 
respect to the skin color. We observe a significant higher presence of non whites in the 
schools that were latter under the municipality control. With respect to age and parents’ 
schooling the cohorts of both groups of schools were, on average, very similar.. 
 
The difference in performance of the students of both groups in Prova Brasil, i.e., 
after transfer of control to the municipalities took place for the S-M group, is shown in 
Table 8. We observe in math an oscillatory behavior across cohorts and in reading a light 
better perform of the schools that remained in the state system. But for both subjects the 
differences are not significant at 5% level. 
 
Table 8: School Panels: 
Difference Proficiency Results 
in the 2005 Prova Brasil Test 
  ΔS-S S-M 
Cohort Math  Reading 
1997 -4,63 -0,11 
 (-1,80)  (-0,04) 
1999 0,33 0,04 
 (0,27)  (0,03) 
2001 -1,46  1,11 
 (-0,96)  (0,74) 
2003 2,05 1,82 
 (1,40)  (1,57) 
t statistics in parenthesis 
 
 
We also don’t observe large changes in the student profile between the two groups 
after the change to the municipalities, as we can see in Table 9 below. 
 
Table 9 School Panels: Student Profile in 2005 
 1997 1999 2001 2003 
 Skin  Color 
S-S  32,9% 35,4% 36,7% 37,7%
S-M  32,9% 29,7% 34,8% 30,9%
 Age 
  6S-S  10,9 10,9 10,9 10,8
S-M  10,7 11,3 11,0 11,1
 Father’s  Schooling 
S-S  8,6 7,9 8,0 8,1
S-M  8,9 7,3 8,0 7,3
 Mother’s  Schooling 
S-S  8,4 7,9 7,8 7,9
S-M  8,0 7,3 7,5 7,0
 
The differences are not very high, the percentage of non-whites in the schools that 
moved to municipal control is higher than in the other group and the difference is 
significant for the 1999 and 2003 cohorts. Mother’s schooling is also lower and the 
difference is significant for those same cohorts. On the other hand father’s schooling is 
significant only for the 1999 cohort and the difference is against the schools that moved to 
municipal control. These schools also present younger students on average. 
 
 Table 10 
Schools Panels: Students Profile Differences in 2005  
Δ S-S S-M 1997 1999 2001 2003 
Age 0,15 -0,03 -0,17 -0,31 
 (1,99) (-0,71) (-2,76) (-5,02) 
Father’s Schooling  -0,33 0,64 0,00 0,01 
 (-1,03) (3,81) (0,01) (0,22) 
Mother’s Schooling  0,36 0,64 0,38 0,90 
  (1,17) (3,96) (1,81) (4,37) 
Skin Color  0,00 0,06 0,02 0,07 
  (0,001) (4,06) (1,08) (3,61) 
t statistics in parenthesis 
    
 
 
4. The Model and Data 
 
To analyze the impact of the municipal school management in the students 
performance as measured by the scores test in math and reading we estimated the following 
equation  
 
(1)  ist i i s is is is is isrt x T R T R y                * 3 2 1 0  
 
where   is the score of the student i, in the school s, that belongs to the system r in the 
year t.. R is a dummy variable with R= 0 if the school belongs to the state system and R =1 
if belongs to the municipal system; T is a time dummy with T = 1 if the year of the test  is 
2005, of Prova Brasil and T = 0 if any other year (1997, 1999, 2001 and 2003).   is the 




s  is the fixed effect estimator for the schools 
First notice that: 
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Therefore, if we subtract equations (i) and (ii) we get the estimator of the difference in 
performance of the state schools that remained as such in both periods: 
 
(vii)  2   SS   
 
If we subtract  equations (iii) and (iv)  we get the estimator of the difference in performance 
of the municipal school that remained as such in both periods: 
 
(viii) 3 2     MM ;  
 
If we subtract equations  (v) and (vi) we get the estimator of the difference in performance 
of the schools that moved prom the state system to the municipal system between the two 
periods: 
 
(ix)  3 2 1       SM .  
 
Using those estimators we can obtain three difference-in-difference estimators:  
 
1. the DID between state and municipal schools that remained in the same school system in 
both periods 
 
3      SS MM ;  
 
2. the DID estimator  between the state schools that moved to municipality control and 
those that were already under it 
 
1      MM SM  
  
3. and finally, the estimator that we are looking for, the DID estimator between the schools 
that moved to the municipality control and the schools under the states control. 
 
3 1        SS SM , 
 
As discussed before we used the data from the 1997, 1999, 2001 and 2003 SAEBs 
and 2005 Prova Brasil from INEP- MEC. We used information only of schools that 
  8matched in both tests. We restricted the analysis to the results of the math and reading tests 
of the students of  the 4




Equation 1 was estimated by ordinary least square and fixed effects separately for the 
reading and the math tests for the four matching years. Therefore we have a total of 16 
panels, one for each of the 4 years of SAEB, 1997, 1999, 2001 and 2003, compared to 
Prova Brasil-2005, for each subject, math and reading, and for the estimation methods, 
OSL and FE.   
 
Table 11 shows the results for the reading test of the four panels for the 4 SAEBs-
Prova Brasil cohorts of schools. The constant captures the omitted dummies: female and 
non white/yellow individuals. With respect to the control variables the first thing to notice 
is that the classical result of girls doing better in reading than boys is also true for Brazil. 
As for the remaining variables, the expected result also holds: the older the student the 
lower the score, the more educated the parents the better the results and whites tend to 
perform better but not always than non whites. What is interesting is that although the 
coefficients are not very different, except for sex, FE estimators tend to be lower than OLS, 
indicating a positive bias between young, white, with more educated parents students and 
schools characteristics fixed between the two periods..  
 
Table 11 
PANEL DATA READING PROFICIENCY SCORE 
 1997-2005  1999-2005  2001-2005  2003-2005 
    OLS  FE OLS  FE OLS  FE OLS  FE 
Age  -4.057***  -2.839*** -4.575*** -3.365*** -4.077*** -2.955*** -5.430*** -4.174*** 
  (0.161)  (0.164) (0.128) (0.129) (0.150) (0.149) (0.119) (0.120) 
Male  -7.838***  -8.204*** -8.002*** -8.322*** -8.463*** -8.653*** -9.087*** -9.494*** 
  (0.468)  (0.446) (0.361) (0.341) (0.412) (0.393) (0.320) (0.300) 
White  0.920 -1.728***  2.973***  -0.059  4.324***  1.297**  4.874***  1.066*** 
  (0.488)  (0.478) (0.379) (0.368) (0.431) (0.421) (0.335) (0.323) 
Father's Schooling  0.469***  0.245*** 0.474*** 0.224*** 0.615*** 0.330*** 0.608*** 0.277*** 
  (0.053)  (0.052) (0.040) (0.039) (0.047) (0.046) (0.036) (0.035) 
Mother’s Schooling  0.714***  0.504*** 0.653*** 0.464*** 0.725*** 0.490*** 0.706*** 0.428*** 
  (0.055)  (0.054) (0.043) (0.041) (0.049) (0.048) (0.038) (0.036) 
Municipal  -0.980 -11.519*  1.382  7.028*  -3.244***  -4.460  -3.189***  4.411 
  (0.953)  (4.484) (1.095) (3.421) (0.914) (2.857) (0.714) (3.119) 
T= 2005  -2.392**  -2.621***  9.304*** 8.306*** 9.162*** 8.061*** 4.560*** 4.666*** 
  (0.777)  (0.775) (0.884) (0.898) (0.790) (0.772) (0.575) (0.549) 
Municipal * T= 2005  -6.400*** -4.634***  -4.504***  -3.702**  1.851  2.305*  0.910  0.972 
  (1.092)  (1.105) (1.163) (1.174) (1.031) (0.998) (0.797) (0.758) 
Constant  217.606***  213.501*** 208.290*** 196.427*** 200.223*** 194.469*** 221.951*** 210.253*** 
   (2.081)  (3.012) (1.756) (2.592) (1.854) (2.458) (1.488) (2.183) 
           
Number of obs.  27902  27902 46984 46984 37570 37570 62726 62764 
F( k, n-k)   257.06    129.71  456,22 258,49 219,93 219,93 762,13 414,76 
R-squared        0.0698 0.0535 0,0735 0,0615 0,0774 0,0735 0,0882 0,0698 
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The estimators of equations (vii)-(ix) computed from the coefficients from table 11 
are shown in Table 12 that presents the difference in the proficiency between Prova Brasil 
and each SAEB for the  groups  of schools. We observe that that schools in the state system 
presented a more volatile behavior than the schools in the municipal  or those that migrated 






Differences in Reading Scores Between Group of Schools 
   1997-2005 1999-2005 2001-2005 2003-2005 
ΔS-S ( 2  )  -11,519  7,028 -4,460 4,411 
  (4,484**)  (3,421**)  (2,857) (3,119) 
ΔM-M( 3 2    )  -7,255 4,604 10,366 5,638 
  (0,801**)  (0,762**)  (0,634**) (0,522**) 
ΔS-M( ) 3 2 1        -18,774 11,632  5,906  10,049 
  (4,427**)  (3,337**)  (2,793**) (3,082**) 
SD in parenthesis 
 
Comparing with the unconditional differences that can be calculated from Table 5 
above and are plotted in Figure 1 below, we observe that, controlling for individual 
characteristics and school fixed effect, the differences in scores in the reading test for the 
schools that remained in the state system, indicated by the red line, SS*, lay always below 
the blue line of the unconditional differences, increasing the negative differences and 
dumping the positives.  
 
Figure 1 
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  10For the schools that remained in the municipals system, Figure 2 shows a similar pattern 
although less pronounced: the conditional differences are larger than the unconditional for 
the negative differences and lower for the positives. Differently from the S-S group, in the 
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Schools in the Municipals Systems
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For the group of schools that migrated from the state to the municipal systems, the 
S-M schools, we observe a more erratic behavior between the conditional differences and 
the unconditional ones: the almost no difference between the 1997 SAEB results and 2005 
Prova Brasil, turns out to be a much larger negative difference when we take into account 
students characteristics and school fixed effect, while the modest improvement in 2003 
becomes more significant.   
 
Figure 3 
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Schools that Migrated from State to Muncipal Systems
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Finally, with respect to the difference in difference estimator, first we observe that 
controlling for students characteristics and school fixed effect only the 1997-2005 
difference is close but higher than the unconditional one. The significant negative 
difference of 1999-2005 in the unconditional data is actually statically not different from 
zero when controls are included, as it is for the remaining years..  
 
Table 13 
  Difference in Difference Estimators – Reading Scores 
 1997-2005  1999-2005  2001-2005  2003-2005 
FEΔSM-SS -16,153  3,326  -2,155  5,383 
 (4,481**)  (3,505)  (2,879)  (3,123) 
Unconditionall ΔSM-SS  -15,726 -5,430  -0,058  -1,441 
 (3,159**)  (2,534**)  (99999)  (1,283) 
 SD in parenthesis 
 
With respect to the math scores, we find similar results for the control variables, 
except for the impact of the sex of the student: in this case we also have the classical result 
of boys performing better than girls in math, although the impact is much lower than the 
negative impact on the reading test. For the remaining variables we have again that white, 
younger students with parents more educated tend to perform better with the fixed effect 
coefficients lower than the OLSs, indicating a positive bias between these characteristics 
and the unchanged characteristics of the schools.  
 
Table 14 
PANEL DATA MATH PROFICIENCY SCORE 
    1997-2005 1999-2005 2001-2005 2003-2005 
    OLS FE  OLS FE  OLS FE  OLS FE 
Age  -3.764*** -2.454*** -3.869*** -2.632*** -3.723*** -2.475*** -4.917*** -3.471*** 
  (0.153) (0.152) (0.123) (0.122) (0.142) (0.140) (0.115) (0.114) 
Male  2.172*** 1.741*** 1.343*** 1.004**  1.922*** 1.753*** 1.460*** 0.973*** 
  (0.442) (0.419) (0.343) (0.323) (0.389) (0.368) (0.306) (0.285) 
White  2.418*** -0.542  3.519*** 0.282  4.492*** 1.098**  5.310*** 0.977** 
  12  (0.467) (0.448) (0.362) (0.349) (0.410) (0.395) (0.322) (0.306) 
Father’s Schooling  0.421*** 0.201*** 0.370*** 0.178*** 0.483*** 0.236*** 0.515*** 0.217*** 
  (0.050) (0.048) (0.039) (0.037) (0.044) (0.043) (0.034) (0.033) 
Mother’s Schooling  0.558*** 0.399*** 0.563*** 0.440*** 0.664*** 0.469*** 0.634*** 0.412*** 
  (0.052) (0.050) (0.040) (0.038) (0.047) (0.045) (0.036) (0.034) 
Municipal  -0.461  5.105 0.903 1.400 -3.737***  -5.161  -4.353***  1.062 
  (0.887) (3.995) (1.007) (3.095) (0.862) (2.843) (0.668) (2.880) 
T=2005  0.400  -0.042  3.918*** 3.101*** 5.128*** 4.572*** 3.664*** 3.572*** 
  (0.724) (0.719) (0.814) (0.851) (0.742) (0.731) (0.546) (0.521) 
Municipal * T=2005  -6.120*** -4.405*** -3.451**  -2.881**  2.686**  2.691**  2.539***  2.792*** 
  (1.1022)  (1.020) (1.073) (1.108) (0.973) (0.951) (0.751) (0.718) 
Constant  213.530*** 200.124*** 208.878*** 199.037*** 203.022*** 195.377*** 219.862*** 206.922*** 
   (1.974) (2.748) (1.669) (2.375) (1.771) (2.365) (1.429) (2.043) 
       .       
Number of obsv  28188 28188 47029 47029 37024 37024 62932 62764 
F( k, n-k)   183.13   62.29  280,82 113,39 265,11 109,79 558,3  218,11 
R-squared    0.0523   0.0397  0,0472 0,0454 0,0562 0,0526 0,0673 0,0545 
 
 
The estimators of equations (vii)-(ix) computed from the coefficients from table 12 





Differences in Math Scores Between Group of Schools 
  1997-2005 1999-2005  2001-2005 2003-2005 
ΔSS ( 2  )  -0,042 3,101 4,572 3,572 
  (0,719) (0,851**)  (0,731**)  (0,521**) 
ΔMM( 3 2    )  -4,447 0,22 7,263 6,364 
  (0,737**) (0,733) (0,612**)  (0,493**) 
ΔSM( ) 3 2 1        0,658 1,62 2,102  7,426 
  (3,798) (3,008) (2,784)  (2,845**) 
SE in parenthesis 
 
We observe that comparing to the unconditional differences that can be computed 
from Table 5 and are displayed in Figure 4 below, the schools that remained under the state 
system, except for the 1997-2005 result, presented a small but significant increase in math 
scores along the period after controlling for schools and students characteristics. This 
increase is more pronounced than suggested by the unconditional differences in the 1999 -
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For the schools that remained in the municipal system, we observe, after the significant 
negative decrease in the 1997 -2005 tests, positive and significant, for 2001 and 2003, 
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With respect to the schools that migrated fro the state to the municipal systems we observe 
that after controlling for the students characteristics and schools fixed effects, the 
  14differences are less pronounced than the unconditional ones. On the other hand all 
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t to the difference in difference estimator we observe an 





Difference in Differ stim  Math Sc
1997 1999 2001 2003
l ΔSM-SS -3,09 -2,936 0,393 1,725 
(2,906) (2,381) (1,965) (2,076) 







Table   
ence E ators – ores 
  -2005 -2005 -2005 -2005 
FEΔSM-SS 0,7 -1,481 -2,47 3,854 






This paper analyses the impact of the decentralization of educational system that is 
taking place in Brazil in the last decade, as a result of several laws that encourage 
municipalities to invest in fundamental education. This process take several forms: increase 
in the number of students attending pre existent schools, construction of new schools and 
the migration of schools previously under the state control to the municipalities. During this 
same period the Brazilian government started to evaluate the students: first with SAEB for 
a sample of schools and more recently Prova Brazil, for the universe of public schools. 
With these tests we can follow several public schools in two points in time the year of 
SAEB and later in Prova Brasil and create an experimental group of schools that were 
under state control in the SAEB exam and have migrated to the municipality control by the 
  15time of Prova Brasil, and a control group of schools that were under the state system all the 
time. Comparing ex ante the students in these two groups we observe that the results in 
terms of the proficiency tests were very similar as they were in their personal 
characteristics: similar proportion of boys and girls, of whites and non whites, about the 
same age and parents schooling. Comparing ex post we observe that the change in the 
proficiency results of the two groups, the DID estimator is not significant except for the 
reading test of the first SAEB exam when the control group, the schools that have remained 
nder the states control, performed better. For the math test the DID estimators were not 
gnificant.      
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